Courtney McGrailHell at the Gates: The Inside Story of Ireland’s Financial Downfall
by John Lee and Daniel McConnell
(Mercier Press, €16.99)
Peter Hegarty
The title is the late Brian Lenihan’s description of the financial pressure on Ireland during the worst of the recession. Lenihan, minister for finance under Brian Cowen, figures large in this brisk, absorbing account of bewildering times. As far as is possible, the authors, seasoned political writers, let the people who made the decisions tell the story.
Lenihan worked on a blueprint for economic recovery, while undergoing treatment for pancreatic cancer, and still found the energy to agitate against Cowen. Moreover, at a time when his colleagues were being spat on (Eamon Ryan) and attacked in the street (Billy Kelleher), he managed to retain the good will of the public. People admired him for his courage in carrying on with his work despite his illness, but also for his willingness to face the cameras and defend his policies.
Poor communication
Cowen, for his part, admits that poor communication was one of his shortcomings. It’s evidently one that continues to dog him. He gave extended interviews to the authors but has nothing new to say about some important matters: for example what did he and Anglo chairman Sean FitzPatrick discuss during that round of golf and subsequent dinner at the Druid’s Heath on July 28 2008? And, more important, what did he know and when did he know it when he was minister for finance (2004-2008)?
He half-heartedly admits to faulty judgement. His predecessor, Bertie Ahern, would have had the sense not to sit up late drinking with a prime time interview on Morning Ireland looming.
That car-crash interview, political errors such as the decision to abolish automatic entitlement to medical cards for those aged over 70 (the embattled government soon reversed it), and his long silences, undermined Cowen’s standing. Any lingering respect for him evaporated when the Troika assumed control of the country’s finances in November 2010.
Eamon Ryan argues that the bailout was unnecessary because Ireland was funded up to mid-2011. But Ireland’s creditors, most notably ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet strong-armed the country into a programme, fearing that its financial troubles would have a contagious effect across Europe.
When it came to dealing with Irish politicians Trichet preferred threats to persuasion. He has denied phoning Brian Lenihan to demand that he save Irish banks. But John McGuinness TD has confirmed to the authors that Trichet did indeed call Lenihan. McGuinness was at the minister’s side when the banker rang, and recalls here Lenihan’s ashen-faced reaction to what we can assume was Trichet’s minatory language: ‘John, we’re in real trouble’. The bank guarantee followed days later.
Towards the end Brian Cowen’s administration endured derision within and without parliament. Most people were glad to see the end of it. But we can be grateful to its most able and persuasive minister for facing up to the country’s economic and financial problems at a time when many remained in denial.
